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Dynamic information design
Deepanshu Vasal
Abstract
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where
the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its
observation to a receiver. Based on this signal, the receiver takes an action that determines rewards
for both the sender and the receiver and controls the state of the system. In this technical note, we
show that this problem can be considered as a problem of dynamic game of asymmetric information
and its perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) can be analyzed using the
algorithms presented in [1], [2] by the same author (among others). We then extend this model when
there is one sender and multiple receivers and provide algorithms to compute a class of equilibria of
this game.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a powerful tool to analyze behavior among strategic agents. An engineering
side of game theory is mechanism design which aims to design systems such that when played
on by strategic agents who optimize their individual objectives, they achieve the same objective
as envisioned by the designer. A classic and one of the most widely used practical example of
mechanism design is auctions [3] where an auctioneer asks for bids by the bidders on a private
good. The auction is designed in such a way that when the strategic bidders bid on the value to
maximize their own valuations, it maximizes the returns of the auctioneer. There is a huge and
growing literature on the theory of Mechanism Design as well as its real world applications [4].
Information design is a relatively new field related to the field of mechanism design introduced
by Kamenica and Gentzkow in [5] where a sender (designer) observes a state of the world not
observed by the receiver. The sender sends a signal to the receiver about this state based on
which the receiver takes an action, which determines individual rewards for both the sender and
the receiver. The sender has to choose a signal that maximizes its reward. The receiver interprets
e-mail: dvasal@umich.edu.
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the state of the world from the sender’s signal knowing that the sender would have chosen a
signal that maximizes its reward, and thus takes an action that maximizes its own reward. There
are two notions of equilibrium that can be considered in this setting: (a) Nash equilibrium and
(b) Stackelberg equilibrium.
Nash equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies of the player such that no user wants to
unilaterally deviate. Thus it can be defined as a fixed-point of best responses to each player’s
strategies. In a stackelberg equilibrium there is a leader and a follower (sender and receiver
in this case, respectively). The leader commits to a policy that is known and observed by the
receiver. Then theStackelberg equilibrium is defined as set of strategies of the players such that
the receiver plays best response to the leader’s committed strategy and the leader, knowing that
the sender will play a best response, plays a strategy that maximizes its reward.
Since [5], there have been a growing number of works on information design including
dynamic information design where the state of the world evolves in a dynamic fashion and
both sender and the receiver play a sequential game [6]–[29]. Authors in [15]–[19] considered a
dynamic version of the model consiodered by [5] where the state evolves as a Markov process,
the sender is forward looking, however, the receiver is myopic. Recently, Farhadi and Teneketzis
in [31] considered a dynamic model with evolving Markovian state and presented (Stackelberg)
equilibrium strategies of the sender and the receiver, where both the sender and the receiver are
fully rational. We refer the readers to [31] for an excellent introduction of information design
problems.
In this note, we consider a general discrete time finite horizon model where there is a state
of the system that is evolving as a controlled Markov process which is privately observed by
the sender. In each time t, the sender sends a signal to the receiver based on which both the
sender and the receiver get individual instantaneous rewards. The objective of the sender is to
maximize its total expected reward over the time horizon T and the objective of the receiver is
to maximize its own. Thus it can be posed as a dynamic game of asymmetric information where
players play alternatively. We assume both the sender and the receiver are fully rational and
forward looking. We consider two equilibrium concepts:(1) Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE)
which can be thought of as extension of Nash equilibrium for dynamic games of incomplete
information, (2) perfect Stackelberg equilibrium (PSE) where the sender has a commitment power
and commits to a policy. In this technical note, we show that game fits within the framework of
the models used by the authors in [1], [2], which provides a tool to analyze Markovian Perfect
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Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) and Markovian Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium (PSE) of this game.
We further extend this model such that instead of one, there are multiple receivers taking actions.
Based on [1], [2], we provide an algorithm to analyze PBEs of this game.
A. Notation
We use uppercase letters for random variables and lowercase for their realizations. For any
variable, subscripts represent time indices and superscripts represent player indices. We use
notation −i to represent all players other than player i i.e. −i = {1, 2, . . . i− 1, i+ 1, . . . , N}.
We use notation At:t′ to represent the vector (At, At+1, . . . At′) when t
′ ≥ t or an empty vector
if t′ < t. We use A−it to mean (A
1
t , A
2
t , . . . , A
i−1
t , A
i+1
t . . . , A
N
t ) . We remove superscripts or
subscripts if we want to represent the whole vector, for example At represents (A
1
t , . . . , A
N
t ).
In a similar vein, for any collection of sets (X i)i∈N , we denote ×i∈NX
i by X . We denote
the indicator function of a set A by IA(·). For any finite set S, ∆(S) represents the space
of probability measures on S and |S| represents its cardinality. We denote by Pg (or Eg) the
probability measure generated by (or expectation with respect to) strategy profile g. We denote
the set of real numbers by R. For a probabilistic strategy profile of players (σit)i∈N where
the probability of action ait conditioned on (a1:t−1, x
i
1:t) is given by σ
i
t(a
i
t|a1:t−1, x
i
1:t), we use
the notation σ−it (a
−i
t |a1:t−1, x
−i
1:t) to represent
∏
j 6=i σ
j
t (a
j
t |a1:t−1, x
j
1:t). All equalities/inequalities
involving random variables are to be interpreted in the a.s. sense. For mappings with range
function sets f : A → (B → C) we use square brackets f [a] ∈ B → C to denote the image of
a ∈ A through f and parentheses f [a](b) ∈ C to denote the image of b ∈ B through f [a]. A
controlled Markov process with state Xt, action At, and horizon T is denoted by (Xt, At)t∈T .
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the model. In Section III,
we present the solution concepts of perfect Bayesian and Perfect Stackelberg equilibrium. In
Section IV, we present a two-step backward-forward recursive algorithm to construct a strategy
profile and a sequence of beliefs of the dynamic game considered. In Section V, we extend that
methodology to multiple receivers.
II. MODEL
Suppose there are two players, a sender and a receiver. Sender observes a controlled Markov
process {Xt}t privately such that
P (xt|x1:t−1, a1:t−1) = Q(xt|xt−1, at−1) (1a)
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where at ∈ A is the action taken by the receiver at time t. Sender takes action st ∈ S at
time t upon observing (s1:t−1, a1:t−1), which is common information among players, and x1:t,
which is sender’s private information. The sets A,X ,S are assumed to be finite and we also
assume that kernel Qx has full support. Players play alternatively such that sender plays at odd
times and the receiver plays at the even times. At the end of interval t, player i receives an
instantaneous reward Ri(xt, at). All reward functions, priors and the update kernels are assumed
to be common knowledge. We also assume that the receiver observes the rewards it receives
{Rrt}t during the course of the game. These could be understood as additional observation of the
state by the receiver. We note that these rewards are a function of current state and action of the
receiver, which the sender perfectly observes. Let gi = (git)t be a probabilistic strategy of player
i ∈ {S,R} where gst : (S × A × R)
t−1 × (X )t → ∆(As) and grt : (S × A × R)
t−1 → ∆(Ar)
such that player i ∈ {S,R} plays action ait according to A
s
t ∼ g
s
t (·|a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) and
Art ∼ g
r
t (·|a1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1, s1:t). Let g := (g
i)i∈{S,R} be a strategy profile of all players. The objective
of the player i is to maximize its total expected reward
J i,g := Eg
[
T∑
t=1
Ri(Xt, At)
]
. (2)
A. Common agent approach
Any history of this game at which players take action is of the form ht = (a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t).
Let Ht be the set of such histories, H
T △= ∪Tt=0Ht be the set of all possible such histories in finite
horizon and H∞
△
= ∪∞t=0Ht for infinite horizon. At any time t the sender observes h
s
t = ht =
(a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) and both players together have h
c
t = a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1 as common history.
Since the receiver does not observe any private information, hrt = h
c
t = (a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1). Let
Hit be the set of observed histories of player i at time t and H
c
t be the set of common histories
at time t.
We recall that the sender and the receiver generate their actions at time t as follows, Ast ∼
gst (·|a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) and A
r
t ∼ g
r
t (·|a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1). An alternative way to view the
problem is as follows. As is done in common information approach [32], at odd time t, a fictitious
common agent observes the common information (a1:t−1, s1:t−2, r
r
1:t−1) and generates prescription
function γst = ψ
s
t [a1:t−1, s1:t−2, r
r
1:t−1]. Sender uses its prescription function γ
s
t to operate on its
private information x1:t to produce its action a
s
t , γ
s
t : X
t → ∆(As) and ast ∼ γ
s
t (·|x1:t). At
even time t, the fictitious common agent observes the common information (a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1)
DRAFT May 18, 2020
TECHNICAL NOTE 5
and generates prescription function γrt = ψ
r
t [a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]. Receiver uses its prescription
function γrt to produce its action a
r
t , where γ
r
t ∈ ∆(A
r) and art ∼ γ
r
t (·). It is easy to see that
for any g policy profile of the players, there exists an equivalent ψ profile of the common agent
(and vice versa) that generates the same control actions for every realization of the information
of the players.
Here, we will consider Markovian common agent’s policy as follows. We call a common
agent’s policy be of “type θ” if the common agent observes the common beliefs µt at odd times
and νt at even times derived from the common observation a1:t−1, s1:t−2, r
r
1:t−1 and a1:t−2, s1:t−1,
rr1:t−1 respectively, and generates prescription functions γ
s
t = θt[µt] and γ
r
t = θt[νt], where
νt(xt) = P
g(Xt = xt|a1:t−1, s1:t−2, r
r
1:t−1) and µt+1(xt+1) = P
g(Xt+1 = xt+1|a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1).
Moreover, the sender’s action only depends on its current private information xt i.e. St ∼ γ
s
t (·|xt).
In the next lemma we show that for any given θ policy, the belief states µt, νt can be updated
recursively as follows. Let µ1(x1) := Q(x1).
Lemma 1: For any given policy of type θ, there exists update functions F,G, independent of
θ, such that
νt = F (µt, γ
s
t , st) (3)
µt+1 = G(νt, at, r
r
t ) (4)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
III. SOLUTION CONCEPTS
A. Solution Concept: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
An appropriate concept of equilibrium for such games is PBE [33], which consists of a pair
(β∗, µ∗) of strategy profile β∗ = (β∗,it )t∈T ,i∈N where β
∗,i
t : H
i
t → ∆(A
i) and a belief profile
µ∗ = (iµ∗t )t∈T ,i∈N where
iµ∗t : H
i
t → ∆(Ht) that satisfy sequential rationality so that for
i = l, f, t ∈ T , hit ∈ H
i
t, β
i
W
i,β∗,i,T
t (h
i
t) ≥W
i,βi,T
t (h
i
t) (5)
where the reward-to-go is defined as
W
i,βi,T
t (h
i
t) , E
βiβ∗,−i, iµ∗t [h
i
t]
{
T∑
n=t
Rin(Xn, An)
∣∣∣hit
}
, (6)
and the beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule whenever possible. In general, a belief for player
i at time t, iµ∗t is defined on history ht = (a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) given its private history h
i
t.
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At any time t, the relevant uncertainty follower has is about the state history x1:t ∈ ×
t
n=1X
and their future actions. In our setting, we consider beliefs that are functions of each player’s
history hit only through the common history h
c
t and are a belief on the current state only. Here
the follower’s belief for each history hct = (a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1) is derived from a common belief
µ∗t [a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1]. In order to anticipate followers actions through its strategy, the leader keeps
track of this belief as well (and it can since it is derived from common information). Thus we
can sufficiently use the system of beliefs, µ∗ = (µ∗t )t∈T , where µ
∗
t : H
c
t → ∆(X ).
B. Solution concept:Stackelberg Equilibrium
An appropriate notion of equilibrium is Stackelberg equilibrium defined as follows. For a
given strategy profile of the sender, σs, the receiver maximizes its total discounted expected
utility over finite horizon T ,
max
σr
E
σs ,σr
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rrt (Xt, At)
}
. (7)
Let BRr(σs) be the set of optimizing strategies of the receiver given a strategy σs of the sender,
i.e.
BRr(σs) = argmax
σr
E
σs ,σr
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rrt (Xt, At)
}
(8)
The sender finds its optimal strategy that maximizes its total expected discounted reward given
that the receiver will use its best response to it,
σ˜s ∈ max
σs
E
σs,BRr(σs)
{
T∑
t=1
δt−1Rst (Xt, At)
}
, (9)
Then (σ˜s, σ˜r) constitute a Stackelberg equilibrium where σ˜r ∈ BRr(σ˜s).
C. Common Perfect Stackelberg equilibrium
In this paper, we will consider sender’ equilibrium policies that only depend on its cur-
rent states xt and action history, i.e. at equilibrium, a
s
t ∼ σ˜
s
t (·|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1, xt), a
r
t ∼
σ˜st (·|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1).
1
For the game considered, we introduce a notion of common Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium
(cPSE), inspired by perfect Bayesian equilibrium [34] as follows.
1Note, however, that for the purpose of equilibrium, the optimization will be performed in the space of all possible strategies
that may depend on the entire history of state.
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Let (σ˜, µ, ν) be a cPSE of the game, where µ = (µt)t∈[T ], ν = (νt)t∈[T ], and for any t,
(a1:t−2, s1:t−1,r
r
1:t−1), µt[a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1] ∈ ∆(X ), νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1] ∈ ∆(X ) are the
equilibrium belief on the current state xt, given the action history (a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1),
(a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1) respectively, i.e. µt[a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1](xt) = P
σ˜(xt|a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1),
νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1](xt) = P
σ˜(xt|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1). Then for all t ∈ [T ],
hrt = (a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1), h
s
t = (a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1), x1:t, for any given σ
s, with some abuse
of notation, let BRr(σs), which is best response of the receiver to any strategy σl of the sender,
be defined as, ∀hct
BRr(σs) :=
⋂
t
⋂
hct
argmax
σr
E
σs,σr
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRrn(Xn, An)|h
c
t
}
(10)
and ∀hct , let the set of optimum strategies of the sender be defined as,
σ˜s ∈
⋂
t
⋂
hct
argmax
σs
E
σs,BRr(σs)
{
T∑
n=t
δn−tRrn(Xn, An)|h
c
t
}
, (11)
Then (σ˜s, σ˜r) constitute a cPSE of the game where σ˜r ∈ BRrt (σ˜
s) ∀ t ∈ [T ]2.
Definition 1: We call a strategy profile σ Markov cPSE if it is a cPSE of type θ.
In the next section, we design an algorithm to compute all Markovian cPSE of the game.
IV. SINGLE RECEIVER
A. PBE methodology
In the following, we adapt the methodology presented in [1] to compute PBE of this game.
B. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈{s,r},t∈[T ], and a
sequence of functions (V st , V
r
t )t∈{1,2,...T+1}, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X ), xT+1 ∈ X ,
V rT+1(µT+1)
△
= 0 (12)
V s+T+1(µT+1, xT+1)
△
= 0. (13)
2Note that we condition on the common information and not on the actual observed histories of the players
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2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀νt ∈ P(X ), let γ˜
r
t = θ
r
t [νt] be generated as follows. γ˜
r
t is the
solution of the following optimization.
γ˜rt ∈ argmax
γrt
E
γrt νt
{
Rrt (Xt, At) + δV
r
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
∣∣∣νt} , (14)
where the expectation in (14) is defined with respect to random variables (Xt, At, R
r
t )
through the measure νt(xt)γ
r
t (at)1(R
r
t = R
r
t (xt, at)), Let
V st+1(xt, νt, xt+1)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t νt
{
V s+t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ), xt+1)|xt
}
(15)
V r+t (νt)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t , νt
{
Rrt (Xt, At) + δV
r
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
}
(16)
Let ∀νt ∈ P(X ), γ˜
s
t = θ
s
t [µt], be generated as follows. γ˜
s
t is the solution of the following
fixed-point equation.
γ˜st (·|xt) ∈ arg max
γst (·|xt)
E
γst (·|xt),θ
r
t [F (µt,γ˜
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(xt, F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St), Xt+1)
∣∣∣µt, xt} ,
(17)
Let
V s+t (µt, xt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t (·|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt,γ˜
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(xt, F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St), Xt+1)
∣∣∣xt} .
(18)
V rt (µt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t , µt
{
V r+t (F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St))
∣∣∣µt} (19)
where the expectation in (17) is with respect to random variables (St, At, Xt+1) through the
measure γst (st|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St)](at)Q(xt+1|xt, at) and F is defined in Appendix A.
C. Forward Recursion
Based on θ defined in the backward recursion above, we now construct a set of strategies σ˜
(through beliefs µ) in a forward recursive way as follows.
1. Initialize at time t = 1,
µ1[φ](x1) := Q(x1). (20)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, ∀i = 1, 2, a1:t ∈ H
c
t+1, x1:t ∈ X
t
σ˜rt (at|a1:t−2, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1) := θ
r
t [νt[a1:t−2, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1]](at) (21)
σ˜st (st|a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1) := θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](st|xt) (22)
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νt[a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1] = F (µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1], θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1]], st) (23a)
µt+1[a1:t, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t] = G(νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1], at, r
r
t ) (23b)
where F,G are defined in Appendix A.
Theorem 1: A strategy and belief profile (σ˜, µ, ν), as constructed through backward/forward
recursion algorithm above is a PBE of the game.
Proof: Our model can be fit in the framework considered in [1] as follows. [1] considers a
model where there are N strategic players, each with a private type xit such that players’ types
are conditionally independent across players given the history of actions. Although it assumes
that all N players act in all periods of the game, simultaneously, it can accommodate cases where
at each time t, players are chosen through an exogenously defined Markov process. This is done
by introducing a “nature” player 0, who perfectly observes its state process (X0t )t ∈ {S,R},
where the state process X0t evolves as a deterministic process such that x
0
t = S for odd times
and x0t = R for even times. Player 0 has reward function zero, and plays actions a
0
t = x
0
t . Once
the quantity a0t−1 is publicly observed, all players can determine that the acting player (at time
t) will be the one indicated by a0t−1 such that a
0
t−1 = x
0
t−1 = S indicates sender plays in the
game and a0t−1 = x
0
t−1 = R indicates that the receiver plays in the game. This is achieved by
setting ∀i, Rit(xt, at) = 0 if i 6= a
0
t , and Qx(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, at) = Qx(x
i
t+1|x
i
t, a
a0t
t ). Here, in each period
only one player (player a0t = x
0
t ) acts in the game while all other non-acting players receive
zero rewards during that period.
Then the above methodology can be seen as adaptation of the methodology considered in [1]
to compute PBE of the game and result of the theorem is implied by [1, Theorem 1].
D. Stackelberg methodology: Single Receiver
In the following, we adapt the methodology presented in [2] to compute cPSE of this game.
E. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈{l,f},t∈[T ], where θ
s
t :
P(X ) → {X → P(A)} , θrt : P(X ) → P(A) and a sequence of functions (V
s
t , V
r
t )t∈{1,2,...T+1},
where V st : P(X )× X → R, V
r
t : P(X )→ R, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
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1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X ), xT+1 ∈ X ,
V rT+1(µT+1)
△
= 0 (24)
V s+T+1(µT+1)
△
= 0. (25)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀νt ∈ P(X ), let γ˜
r
t = θ
r
t [νt] be generated as follows. γ˜
r
t is the
solution of the following optimization.
γ˜rt ∈ argmax
γrt
E
γrt νt
{
Rrt (Xt, At) + δV
r
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
∣∣∣νt} , (26)
where the expectation in (26) is defined with respect to random variables (Xt, At, R
r
t )
through the measure νt(xt)γ
r
t (at)1(R
r
t = R
r
t (xt, at)), Let
V st+1(xt, νt)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t νt
{
V s+t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
}
(27)
V r+t (νt)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t , νt
{
Rrt (Xt, At) + δV
r
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
}
(28)
Let ∀νt ∈ P(X ), γ˜
s
t = θ
s
t [µt], be generated as follows. γ˜
s
t is the solution of the following
fixed-point equation.
γ˜st ∈ argmax
γst
E
γst ,θ
r
t [F (µt,γ
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (Xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(Xt, F (µt, γ
s
t , St))
}
(29)
Let
V s+t (µt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t (·|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt,γ˜
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (Xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(Xt, F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St), Xt+1)
}
. (30)
V rt (µt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t , µt
{
V r+t (F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St))
}
(31)
where the expectation in (29) is with respect to random variables (Xt, St, At) through the
measure µt(xt)γ
s
t (st|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt, γ
s
t , St)](at)Q(xt+1|xt, at) and F is defined in Appendix A.
F. Forward Recursion
Based on θ defined in the backward recursion above, we now construct a set of strategies σ˜
(through beliefs µ) in a forward recursive way as follows.
1. Initialize at time t = 1,
µ1[φ](x1) := Q(x1). (32)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, ∀i = 1, 2, a1:t ∈ H
c
t+1, x1:t ∈ X
t
σ˜rt (at|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1) := θ
r
t [νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](at) (33)
σ˜st (st|a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) := θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](st|xt) (34)
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νt[a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1] = F (µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1], θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]], st) (35a)
µt+1[a1:t, s1:t, r
r
1:t] = G(νt[a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1], at, r
r
t ) (35b)
where F,G are defined in Appendix A.
Theorem 2: A strategy and belief profile (σ˜, µ, ν), as constructed through backward/forward
recursion algorithm above is a cPSE of the game.
Proof:
Then the above methodology can be seen as adaptation of the methodology considered in [2]
to compute cPSE of the game and result of the theorem is implied by [2, Theorem 1]. In this
case, since only the sender has private information and thus can influence the beliefs, it solves
for the optimization problem in (29). The receiver however doesn’t have any private information
and solves for an optimization problem in (26).
V. MULTIPLE PLAYERS
In this section, we consider the case when there are multiple receivers. As before, each receiver
i takes action at time t, A
r,i
t as A
r,i
t ∼ g
r,i
t (·|a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1). The above methodologies can
be extended as follows,
A. PBE methodology: Multiple Receivers
B. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈{s,r1,...,rN},t∈[T ], and a
sequence of functions (V st , V
r,1
t , . . . , V
r,N
t )t∈{1,2,...T+1}, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X ), xT+1 ∈ X ,
V
r,i
T+1(µT+1)
△
= 0 (36)
V s+T+1(µT+1, xT+1)
△
= 0. (37)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀νt ∈ P(X ), let γ˜
r,i
t = θ
r
t [νt] be generated as follows. γ˜
r,i
t is the
solution of the following fixed-point equation.
γ˜
r,i
t ∈ argmax
γ
r,i
t
E
γ
r,i
t ,γ˜
r,−i
t νt
{
R
r,i
t (Xt, At) + δV
r,i
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
∣∣∣νt} , (38)
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where the expectation in (38) is defined with respect to random variables (Xt, At) through
the measure νt(xt)γ
r,i
t (a
i
t)γ˜
r,−i
t (a
−i
t ). Let
V st+1(xt, νt, xt+1)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t (·) νt
{
V s+t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ), xt+1)|xt
}
(39)
V
r+,i
t (νt)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t , νt
{
R
r,i
t (Xt, At) + δV
r,i
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t )
}
(40)
Let ∀νt ∈ P(X ), γ˜
s
t = θ
s
t [µt], be generated as follows. γ˜
s
t is the solution of the following
fixed-point equation.
γ˜st ∈ arg max
γst (·|xt)
E
γst (·|xt),θ
r
t [F (µt,γ˜
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(xt, F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St), Xt+1)
∣∣∣µt, xt} ,
(41)
Let
V s+t (µt, xt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t (·|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt,γ˜
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(xt, F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St), Xt+1)
∣∣∣xt} .
(42)
V
r,i
t (µt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t , µt
{
V
r+,i
t (F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St))
∣∣∣µt} (43)
where the expectation in (41) is with respect to random variables (St, At, Xt+1) through the
measure γst (st|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St)](at)Q(xt+1|xt, at) and F is defined in Appendix A.
C. Forward Recursion
Based on θ defined in the backward recursion above, we now construct a set of strategies σ˜
(through beliefs µ) in a forward recursive way as follows.
1. Initialize at time t = 1,
µ1[φ](x1) := Q(x1). (44)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, ∀i = 1, 2, a1:t ∈ H
c
t+1, x1:t ∈ X
t
σ˜
r,i
t (at|a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1) := θ
r,i
t [νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](a
i
t) (45)
σ˜st (st|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) := θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](st|xt) (46)
νt[a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1] = F (µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1], θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]], st)
(47)
µt+1[a1:t, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t] = G(νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1], at, r
r
t ) (48)
where F,G are defined in Appendix A.
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Theorem 3: A strategy and belief profile (σ˜, µ, ν), as constructed through backward/forward
recursion algorithm above is a PBE of the game.
Proof: By similar arguments as that in Theorem 1 above, the result is implied by [1,
Theorem 1].
D. cPSE methodology: Multiple Receivers
In this section, we consider the case when there are multiple receivers. As before, each receiver
i takes action at time t, A
r,i
t as A
r,i
t ∼ g
r,i
t (·|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1). The above methodology can be
extended as follows.
E. Backward Recursion
In this section, we define an equilibrium generating function θ = (θit)i∈{s,r1,...,rN},t∈[T ], and a
sequence of functions (V st , V
r,1
t , . . . , V
r,N
t )t∈{1,2,...T+1}, in a backward recursive way, as follows.
1. Initialize ∀piT+1 ∈ P(X ), xT+1 ∈ X ,
V
r,i
T+1(µT+1)
△
= 0 (49)
V s+T+1(µT+1)
△
= 0. (50)
2. For t = T, T − 1, . . . 1, ∀νt ∈ P(X ), for all i, let γ˜
r,i
t = θ
r,i
t [νt] be generated as follows.
γ˜
r,i
t is the solution of the following fixed-point equation.
γ˜
r,i
t ∈ argmax
γ
r,i
t
E
γ
r,i
t ,γ˜
r,−i
t νt
{
R
r,i
t (Xt, At) + δV
r,i
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t ))
∣∣∣νt} , (51)
where the expectation in (51) is defined with respect to random variables (Xt, At) through
the measure νt(xt)γ
r,i
t (a
i
t)γ˜
r,−i
t (a
−i
t ). Note that the above equation is similar to a fixed-point
equation corresponding to that of a Bayesian Nash. Let
V st+1(xt, νt)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t νt
{
V s+t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t )
}
(52)
V
r+,i
t (νt)
△
= Eγ˜
r
t , νt
{
R
r,i
t (Xt, At) + δV
r,i
t+1(G(νt, At, R
r
t )
}
(53)
Let ∀νt ∈ P(X ), γ˜
s
t = θ
s
t [µt], be generated as follows. γ˜
s
t is the solution of the following
fixed-point equation.
γ˜st ∈ argmax
γst
E
γst ,θ
r
t [F (µt,γ
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (Xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(Xt, F (µt, γ
s
t , St))
∣∣∣µt} , (54)
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Let
V s+t (µt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t θ
r
t [F (µt,γ˜
s
t ,St)]µt
{
Rst (Xt, At) + δV
s
t+1(Xt, F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St))
}
. (55)
V
r,i
t (µt)
△
= Eγ˜
s
t , µt
{
V
r+,i
t (F (µt, γ˜
s
t , St))
∣∣∣µt} (56)
where the expectation in (54) is with respect to random variables (Xt, St, At) through the
measure pit(xt)γ
s
t (st|xt)θ
r
t [F (µt, γ
s
t , St)](at)Q(xt+1|xt, at) and F is defined in Appendix A.
F. Forward Recursion
Based on θ defined in the backward recursion above, we now construct a set of strategies σ˜
(through beliefs µ) in a forward recursive way as follows.
1. Initialize at time t = 1,
µ1[φ](x1) := Q(x1). (57)
2. For t = 1, 2 . . . T, ∀i = 1, 2, a1:t ∈ H
c
t+1, x1:t ∈ X
t
σ˜rt (at|a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1) := θ
r
t [νt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](at) (58)
σ˜st (st|a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1, x1:t) := θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−2, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]](st|xt) (59)
νt[a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1] = F (µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1], θ
s
t [µt[a1:t−1, s1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1]], st) (60a)
µt+1[a1:t, s1:t, r
r
1:t] = G(νt[a1:t−1, s1:t, r
r
1:t−1], at, r
r
t ) (60b)
where F,G are defined in Appendix A.
Theorem 4: A strategy and belief profile (σ˜, µ, ν), as constructed through backward/forward
recursion algorithm above is a cPSE of the game.
Proof: The result is implied by [2, Theorem 1] using similar arguments as in the proof of
Theorem 1 above. Note that in this case, there are multiple receivers maximizing their rewards
in each step in (51), thus instead of an optimization problem, they are solving a fixed-point
equation similar to that of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
DRAFT May 18, 2020
TECHNICAL NOTE 15
APPENDIX
Proof:
νt(xt) = P
θ(xt|s1:t, a1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1) (61)
=
P θ(xt, st|s1:t−1, a1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1)∑
xt
P θ(xt, st|s1:t−1, a1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1)
(62)
=
µt(xt)γ
s
t (st|xt)∑
xt
µt(xt)γst (st|xt)
. (63)
Thus,
νt = F (µt, γ
s
t , st) (64)
µt+1(xt+1) = P
θ(xt+1|s1:t, a1:t, r
r
1:t) (65)
=
∑
xt
P θ(xt, at, r
r
t , xt+1|s1:t, a1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1)∑
xt
P θ(xt, at, rrt |s1:t, a1:t−1, r
r
1:t−1)
(66)
=
∑
xt
νt(xt)γ
r
t (at)1(r
r
t = R
r
t (xt, at))Qx(xt+1|xt, at)∑
xt
νt(xt)γrt (at)1(r
r
t = R
r
t (xt, at))
(67)
=
∑
xt
νt(xt)1(r
r
t = R
r
t (xt, at))Qx(xt+1|xt, at)∑
xt
νt(xt)1(rrt = R
r
t (xt, at))
(68)
Thus,
µt+1 = G(νt, at, r
r
t ) (69)
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